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STATE NET NEUTRALITY 
Daniel A. Lyons* 
INTRODUCTION 
For nearly a century, state regulators played an important role in 
telecommunications regulation. The 1934 Communications Act gave the Federal 
Communications Commission authority to regulate interstate telephone service, but 
explicitly left intrastate calls—which comprised 98% of Depression-era telephone 
traffic—to state public utility commissions.1 Although the 1996 
Telecommunications Act updated this structure to fit a post-monopoly environment, 
Congress continued to rely significantly on state regulators to bring its vision of local 
competition to fruition.2 
Changes in the competitive and technological landscape over the past two 
decades have nonetheless rendered these regulators largely obsolete. The traditional 
distinction between local and long-distance service disappeared, eradicating the 
portion of the telephone market traditionally entrusted to state public utility 
commissions.3 Further, an increasingly competitive market for voice service 
prompted many states to voluntarily relinquish what residual regulatory authority 
remained over rates and terms of service.4 Then, the Internet displaced the telephone 
                                                          
 
* Professor, Boston College Law School. Thanks to Tom Barnico, the Hon. D. Michael Fisher, Crystal 
Lyons, Randolph May, Geoff Manne, Geoffrey Why, and participants at the University of Pittsburgh Law 
Review Net Without Neutrality Symposium for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
1 Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 
U.S.C. § 151 (1996)); see Daniel A. Lyons, Technology Convergence and Federalism: Who Should 
Decide the Future of Telecommunications Regulation?, 43 UNIV. MICH. J.L. REF. 383, 389 (2010). 
2 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
3 See Philip J. Weiser, The Forgotten Core of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 68 FED. COMM. L.J. 
71, 72 (2016) (noting the 1996 Act is “a foreign concept to those who no longer think of 
telecommunications markets in terms of local or long distance services”). 
4 The California Public Utilities Commission’s 2006 decision to deregulate telephone service is 
illustrative. Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission’s Own Motion to Assess and Revise the 
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system as America’s primary telecommunications network.5 Unlike telephony, the 
Internet was born as an inherently national network, marked by a light-touch federal 
regulatory regime that left little room for the states.6 Landline telephony faded to 
obscurity, taking with it most traditional state regulatory authority over 
telecommunications. By the late 2000s, scholars and policymakers alike recognized 
that the era of comprehensive state telecommunications regulation had largely come 
to an end.7 
Perhaps surprisingly, however, the first years of the Trump Administration 
have seen a resurgence in state telecommunications regulation—driven not by state 
institutional concerns, but by policy disagreements over net neutrality. In 2017, the 
Federal Communications Commission (“the Commission” or “FCC”) repealed an 
earlier Order classifying broadband providers as common carriers and regulating 
their network management practices.8 The Commission’s decision prompted a flurry 
of activity in governors’ mansions and legislatures nationwide, activity which sought 
to restore at the state level regulations that had been repealed at the federal level. 
                                                          
 
Regulation of Telecommunications Utilities, Calif. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, Dec. No. 06-08-030 (2006) 
(noting that “dramatic changes have occurred in the voice communications market” rendering it “far more 
competitive” than in previous eras. The Commission eliminated most rate regulation and tariff 
requirements, relying instead on competitive forces to provide just and reasonable rates.). 
5 See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 874 (2009) (“Just as 
telephony replaced telegraphy, access to the Internet has replaced telephony as the new basic, general-
purpose communications network.”). 
6 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2018) (“It is the policy of the United States . . . to preserve the vibrant and 
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, 
unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”); see also WILLIAM E. KENNARD, CONNECTING THE GLOBE: A 
REGULATOR’S GUIDE TO BUILDING A GLOBAL INFORMATION COMMUNITY, at IX–2 (1999) (observing 
that “[g]overnment policy can have a profound impact on Internet development; it can either foster it or 
hinder it. To date, the Internet has flourished in large part due to the absence of regulation. A ‘hands–off’ 
approach allows the Internet to develop free from the burdens of traditional regulatory mechanisms.”). 
7 See, e.g., Charles J. Cooper & Brian Stuart Koukoutchos, Federalism and the Telephone: The Case for 
Preemptive Federal Deregulation in the New World of Intermodal Competition, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 293, 317 (2008); Douglas C. Sicker, The End of Federalism in Telecommunications 
Regulations?, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTEL. PROP. 130, 132 (2005). 
8 In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311 (2018). 
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Through executive orders9 and new statutes,10 states aggressively re-entered the 
telecommunications policy arena. These efforts were challenged in turn by the 
Commission,11 whose 2017 order had ostensibly preempted state broadband 
regulations12 (as had the 2015 Open Internet Order that it replaced).13 
This Article addresses the broader federalism questions raised by this net 
neutrality clash. Part I provides an overview of telecommunications federalism from 
the 1934 Communications Act through the present day, looking at the division of 
federal and state jurisdiction over traditional telephone service, wireless telephony, 
and information services. Part II examines the various steps that states have taken to 
regulate broadband providers’ network management practices in response to the 
Commission’s Restoring Internet Freedom Order and assesses the likelihood that 
these initiatives will survive a federal preemption challenge. Part III looks more 
broadly at the question of state authority to regulate broadband network management 
practices. It discusses the statutory and constitutional limits on state power to 
regulate broadband providers. Once the sphere of potential authority is defined, Part 
IV addresses how states should exercise this power and highlights alternative tools 
available for states that wish to shape the net neutrality debate. 
I. STATE REGULATION AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
States have long played a role in telecommunications regulation. But the 
contours of that role have differed somewhat over time, as Congress and the 
Commission drew different jurisdictional lines in response to changes in technology 
                                                          
 
9 See Haw. Exec. Order No. 18-02 (2018); Mont. Exec. Order No. 3-2018 (2018); N.J. Exec. Order No. 9 
(2018); N.Y. Exec. Order No. 175 (2018); R.I. Exec. Order No. 18-02 (2018); Vt. Exec. Order No. 2-18 
(2018). 
10 S.B. 822. 2018 Gen. Assemb. (Cal. 2018); H.B. 4155, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2018); S. 289 
(Vt. 2018); H.B. 2282, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018). 
11 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, United States v. California, No. 2:18-at-
01539 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2018). 
12 Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. at 427-29 (“Just as the Title II Order promised to ‘exercise 
our preemption authority to preclude states from imposing regulations on broadband service that are 
inconsistent’ with the federal regulatory scheme, we conclude that we should exercise our authority to 
preempt any state or local requirements that are inconsistent with the federal deregulatory approach we 
adopt today.”). 
13 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5804 (2015) (“[W]e announce our firm 
intention to exercise our preemption authority to preclude states from imposing obligations on broadband 
service that are inconsistent with the carefully tailored regulatory scheme we adopt in this Order.”). 
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and marketplace dynamics. This section traces that evolution over three 
communications networks: traditional landline telephone regulation, wireless 
telephony, and information services (including broadband networks). 
A. Landline Telephone Regulation 
Traditional telephone regulation first developed at the state level, reflecting the 
nature of early telephony as a primarily local service. In the late nineteenth century, 
local exchanges developed as a method of coordinating telephone traffic among 
members of a community. But communication among communities was limited, in 
part because local exchanges refused to interconnect with one another and in part 
because Bell Telephone, the nation’s first telephone company, held key patents on 
technology to transmit calls over longer distances.14 At the same time, states were 
experimenting with public utility commissions to regulate new industries “affected 
by the public interest” that arose in response to the second Industrial Revolution.15 
By the early twentieth century, these agencies included telephone service within their 
portfolio. On the eve of the founding of the Federal Communications Commission, 
forty-five of the forty-eight states regulated local telephony via public utility 
commissions.16 
Over time, federal regulators also began asserting jurisdiction over telephone 
service, partly in response to concerns about anticompetitive behavior by Bell 
Telephone, the dominant player in the industry. Congress initially gave the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (“ICC”) jurisdiction over interstate telephone networks 
under the 1910 Mann Elkins Act, though the agency was preoccupied by monitoring 
the nation’s railroad industry and did little to oversee Bell.17 An early federal antitrust 
case scored more moderate success, yielding a 1913 agreement by Bell (known as 
the Kingsbury Commitment) to interconnect its long-distance network to non-Bell 
local telephone companies and to accept ICC oversight of its merger and acquisition 
activity.18 
                                                          
 
14 See Lyons, supra note 1, at 387–88; Charles M. Davidson & Michael J. Santorelli, Federalism in 
Transition: Recalibrating the Federal—State Regulatory Balance for the All-IP Era, 29 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1131, 1141 (2014). 
15 Davidson & Santorelli, supra note 14, at 1141–42. 
16 See Lyons, supra note 1, at 389. 
17 Id. at 388 n.16. 
18 PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW §§ 1.3.3, 3.2.2. (2d ed. 1999). 
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In 1934, Congress transferred this authority to a new, sector-specific regulator, 
the Federal Communications Commission. The Communications Act (the “Act”) 
charged this new Commission with regulating interstate and international telephone 
service pursuant to a statutorily-mandated common carriage regime.19 Under the Act, 
Bell Telephone had to offer its service at just and reasonable rates pursuant to tariffs 
filed with the Commission and could not unreasonably discriminate among 
customers in the provision of that service.20 
To ameliorate concerns among state regulators, the Act contained an important 
state savings provision. Section 2 granted the Commission jurisdiction over “all 
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio” but provided that “nothing 
in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction 
with respect to . . . charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or 
regulations for or in connection with intrastate communication service.”21 This 
proviso was significant, as it blunted a potential assault on state authority that some 
feared when jurisdiction rested with the ICC.22 In the Shreveport Rate Case, the 
Supreme Court permitted the ICC to set intrastate railroad rates if the agency found 
that intrastate rates affected interstate commerce, thus allowing the ICC to preempt 
decisions that were traditionally the prerogative of state public utility commissions.23 
Section 2 of the Communications Act explicitly prevented the Federal 
Communications Commission from making a similar jurisdictional power grab over 
intrastate telephone rates.24 
The Act thus codified the existing Dual Federalism regime over domestic 
telephone service. As the Supreme Court explained, Congress sought “to divide the 
world of domestic telephone service neatly into two hemispheres—one comprised of 
interstate service, over which the FCC would have plenary authority, and the other 
made up of intrastate services, over which the states would retain exclusive 
                                                          
 
19 Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 
U.S.C. § 151). 
20 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–03 (2018). 
21 Federal Communications Act, §§ 221(b), 406 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2018)). 
22 Davidson & Santorelli, supra note 14, at 1143–44. 
23 Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914). 
24 47 U.S.C. § 152(b). 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H  L A W  R E V I E W  
 




ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2019.657 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
jurisdiction.”25 The preservation of state autonomy over intrastate service made 
sense, given the state of the industry: as noted above, intrastate calls comprised 98 
percent of all telephone traffic, so regulation should reside primarily at the local 
level.26 At the same time, the existence of a federal regulator with explicit jurisdiction 
over interstate traffic thwarted the errant attempt by a state to regulate beyond its 
boundaries. As the Court discussed in Smith v. Illinois Bell (a pre-Communications 
Act case), “The separation of the intrastate and interstate property, revenues and 
expenses of the company is important not simply as a theoretical allocation to two 
branches of the business. It is essential to the appropriate recognition of the 
competent governmental authority in each field of regulation.”27 Of course, this tidy 
distinction was not always so neat in practice. Intrastate and interstate service often 
relied on the same facilities and were often provided by divisions within the same 
company, leading to disputes about how to divide jurisdiction at the margins over 
questions such as depreciation methods for shared equipment.28 But overall, the 
interstate/intrastate divide would define the boundary between federal and state 
authority over traditional telephone service for the next six decades. 
The Act’s division of jurisdictional authority mirrored that contained in many 
other New Deal-era regulatory statutes. The Federal Power Act, for example, gave 
the Federal Power Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) 
jurisdiction over interstate transmission of electricity and interstate wholesale 
electricity sales, but explicitly barred the Commission from exercising jurisdiction 
over local distribution or intrastate electricity transmission.29 The Natural Gas Act 
makes a similar distinction between interstate and intrastate gas transportation and 
sale.30 Like the Communications Act, these statutes contemplated “a harmonious, 
dual system of regulation . . . [with] federal and state regulatory bodies operating 
side by side, each active in its own sphere . . . without any confusion of functions.”31 
                                                          
 
25 La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 360 (1986). Section two prohibited the Commission 
from regulating intrastate communications, but states were prohibited from regulating interstate calls. 
26 Federal Communications Act of 1934 § 2; see Lyons, supra note 1, at 389. 
27 Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133, 148 (1930). 
28 La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 360. 
29 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2018). For a history of this clause, see Daniel A. Lyons, Protecting States in the 
New World of Energy Federalism, 67 EMORY L.J. 921, 930 (2018). 
30 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2018). 
31 Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 467 (1943). 
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As in many of these other regulated industries,32 shifting technological and 
legal developments eventually prompted Congress to replace this Dual Federalism 
model with a Cooperative Federalism regime. Beginning in the late 1970s, the 
Commission began pushing interstate service in a more competitive direction, first 
by facilitating entry of new long-distance providers such as MCI and Sprint,33 and 
ultimately by breaking up the Bell Monopoly in 1982.34 Local service was still 
largely monopolistic, however, due partly to economic factors and partly to state 
legislation protecting incumbents from competition. Through the 1996 
Telecommunications Act,35 Congress sought to create competition in local telephone 
service, by preempting state-granted local monopolies and requiring incumbent local 
providers to make their networks available for new competitors to lease at regulated 
rates.36 This manufactured competition was a federally mandated scheme, to be 
executed in part by state regulators against a backdrop of federal guidelines set by 
the Commission.37 States were to review interconnection agreements between local 
carriers and arbitrate disputes between negotiating parties to facilitate such 
agreements.38 States also retained regulatory authority over local providers to 
promote universal service, protect consumers, and manage local rights-of-way.39 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act both reflected and exacerbated a more 
fundamental fault line between federal and state regulators. Federalism disputes 
during the Dual Federalism Era largely reflected somewhat mundane issues such as 
depreciation schedules or jurisdictional separation rules.40 But as Dual Federalism 
gave way to Cooperative Federalism, clashes between federal and state regulators 
                                                          
 
32 See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 29, at 931–41. 
33 See, e.g., In re Applications of Microwave Comm., Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969), reh’g denied, 21 
F.C.C.2d 190 (1970); see Lyons, supra note 1, at 389–90. 
34 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D.D.C. 1982). The settlement became 
effective on January 1, 1984. See Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the 
Telecommunications Act: Regulation of Telecommunications Under Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 
1395, 1396 (1999). 
35 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
36 47 U.S.C. §§ 251, 253 (2018); see Lyons, supra note 1, at 393–94. 
37 Lyons, supra note 1, at 393. 
38 47 U.S.C. § 252 (2018). 
39 Id. § 253. 
40 See, e.g., La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 360 (1986). 
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reflected a larger dispute over the goal of communications policy. Congress and the 
FCC sought to promote efficiency and competition, while state regulators remained 
focused on traditional concerns about equity, affordability, and redistribution.41 
Federal authorities ultimately won this policy battle against their state 
counterparts. Even before the 1996 Act, courts blessed many of the Commission’s 
efforts to promote competition even when doing so pushed federal regulators into 
the state’s sphere. For example, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the Commission may 
preempt state authority where it was impossible to separate the intrastate and 
interstate effects of a federal policy42—a decision that the Supreme Court later cited 
with approval.43 In the 1996 Act context, federal supremacy reached its peak in 
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,44 where the Supreme Court recognized that the 
Commission had broad discretion to enact rules to further the Act’s goals, even when 
those rules directed state regulators on how to exercise authority explicitly delegated 
to them under the Act.45 
Since the 1996 Act, technological and marketplace developments have 
rendered traditional state telephone regulation largely obsolete. Beginning in the 
early 2000s, customers stopped recognizing local telephone service as a separate, 
standalone product. A series of mergers established Verizon and AT&T as national 
networks that offered local and long-distance service bundled together, reducing 
intrastate service to a throw-in portion of a broader, competitive telecommunications 
bundle.46 At the same time, wireless communication, Voice-over-Internet-Protocol 
(“VoIP”) service, and other communications offerings developed as popular 
substitutes for traditional landline telephone service.47 The number of residential 
                                                          
 
41 Eli Noam, Federal and State Roles in Telecommunications: The Effects of Deregulation, 36 VAND. L. 
REV. 949, 956 (1983). 
42 See, e.g., N.C. Util. Comm’n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976); N.C. Util. Comm’n v. FCC, 552 
F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977). 
43 See La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 376 n.4 (recognizing the impossibility exception but finding it 
inapplicable to the case at bar). 
44 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999). 
45 Id. at 374; see Davidson & Santorelli, supra note 14, at 1160. 
46 See, e.g., Robert C. Atkinson, Digital Age Communications Law Reform: Telecom Regulation for the 
21st Century: Avoiding Gridlock, Adapting to Change, 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 379, 386 (2006). 
47 Id. at 390. 
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landlines declined from a high of 146.7 million in 200048 to only 22.5 million in 
2017.49 Recognizing this decline and the increased consumer choice offered by these 
technological developments, many states began deregulating local telephone 
communications by the mid-2000s.50 That is not to suggest that states have 
abandoned the telecommunications field completely. In addition to retaining 
traditional consumer protection authority, many public utility commissions remain 
active on issues such as universal service, local rights-of-way, and public safety.51 
But most have abandoned the comprehensive oversight that historically marked state 
telephone regulation. 
B. Wireless Telephony 
The Act draws a different jurisdictional line regarding wireless telephone 
service, not on the basis of geography, but regulatory activity. Section 332(c), 
adopted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,52 provides that 
“no state or local government shall have any authority to regulate the entry or the 
rates charged by any commercial mobile service or any private mobile service.”53 
But like Section 2, Section 332 also contains a savings clause: “this paragraph shall 
not prohibit a State from regulating the other terms and conditions of commercial 
mobile services.”54 The Act also explicitly preserves state and local zoning authority 
                                                          
 
48 Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n Releases Latest Data on Local Tel. 
Competition (May 21, 2001). For Pre-2013 data, see Local Telephone Competition Reports, FED. COMMS. 
COMMISSION (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.fcc.gov/general/local-telephone-competition-reports. Note 
that this figure may be slightly inflated, as it includes residential and small business lines. 
49 FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, FCC 18-181, IN THE MATTER OF COMMUNICATIONS MARKETPLACE 
REPORT, para. 67 (2018); INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV. WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, FED. 
COMMC’NS COMM’N, VOICE TELEPHONE SERVICES: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2017 (2018). 
50 See, e.g., Calif. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Dec. No. 06-08-030, Order Instituting Rulemaking on the 
Commission’s Own Motion to Assess and Revise the Regulation of Telecommunications Utilities (2006). 
51 See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM’RS, RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS AT THE 2019 WINTER POLICY SUMMIT OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY 
UTILITY COMMISSIONERS (2019) (passing resolution urging prompt resolution of National Lifeline 
Verifier database). 
52 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002(b), 107 Stat. 312, 392 
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (1994)). 
53 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (2018). The Act also amended Section 2 to clarify that wireless service does 
not fall within the state savings clause. Id. § 152(b). 
54 Id. 
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over the placement of wireless facilities such as cell phone towers, subject to federal 
judicial review for unreasonable discrimination.55 
Congress displaced state authority because it recognized that, unlike traditional 
landline service, wireless service was an inherently national service that would 
benefit from uniformity. The House Report on the bill explained that preemption 
would “foster the growth and development of mobile services that, by their nature, 
operate without regard to state lines as an integral part of the national 
telecommunications infrastructure.”56 Cell phones are mobile, making it more 
difficult to distinguish with certainty between intrastate and interstate calls. 
Moreover, unlike traditional landline telephony, wireless service was born as a 
competitive enterprise. The original allocation of spectrum licenses contemplated 
multiple providers in each territory, and the infrastructure of distributed cell sites was 
easier to deploy than landlines, reducing the need for local consultation and 
regulatory oversight as a bulwark against suspected monopolization.57 Thomas 
Hazlett showed that wireless preemption proved to be efficient, with per-minute 
prices falling 80% in the decade following preemption due to competitive entry and 
national network consolidation that allowed firms to offer nationwide plans.58 
Moreover, courts have interpreted the scope of Section 332’s preemption 
provision broadly, reducing states primarily to a consumer protection role. The 
robustness of this provision was tested in Cellco Partnership v. Hatch.59 In that case, 
Minnesota passed a statute prohibiting providers from implementing changes in a 
wireless contract that “could result” in increased rates or an extended contract term, 
without first undertaking a 60-day waiting period and receiving affirmative consent 
from the customer.60 The court concluded that the statute effectively fixed rates by 
preventing freezing rates during the waiting period (and longer for customers who 
                                                          
 
55 Id. § 332(c)(7). 
56 H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 260 (1993); see Leonard J. Kennedy & Heather A. Purcell, Section 332 of 
the Communications Act of 1934: A Federal Regulatory Framework that is “Hog Tight, Horse High, and 
Bull Strong,” 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 547, 560 (1998). 
57 See Kennedy & Purcell, supra note 56, at 560. 
58 Thomas W. Hazlett, Is Federal Preemption Efficient in Cellular Phone Regulation?, 56 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 155, 221 (2003). 
59 Cellco P’ship v. Hatch, 431 F.3d 1077 (2005). 
60 Id. at 1079. 
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did not opt in to the change).61 Minnesota argued that its regulation merely enforced 
traditional contract law in ways that regulated consumer protection in the wireless 
space, and therefore fell into the “other terms and conditions” safe harbor.62 But the 
court rejected this argument because the regulation did not reflect a rule applied to 
the interpretation of contracts generally—instead, it created a unique duty on 
providers of wireless telecommunications services.63 Moreover, the regulation 
directly impacted the rate that carriers could charge and therefore was more properly 
classified as an impermissible state regulation of rates.64 
C. Information Services 
The Commission took a similar approach to information services; it preempted 
state regulation in order to impose a nationwide deregulatory regime. Information 
services (originally called “enhanced services”) are defined as services that “offer a 
capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, 
utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications.”65 In the pre-
Internet era, this category would have included services such as remote database 
access and voicemail, which use communications networks to engage in a data 
processing function.66 In the Computer II proceeding, the Commission chose not to 
regulate information services, finding that “regulation of enhanced communications 
services would limit the kinds of services an unregulated vendor could offer, 
restricting this fast-moving, competitive market.”67 In Computer III, the Commission 
went further, preempting state regulation of enhanced services that would 
“necessarily thwart or impede federal regulation.”68 Mirroring Congress’s 
conclusions about wireless markets, the Commission found that “[t]he enhanced 
services market generally is national or regional in scope, and a degree of certainty 
                                                          
 
61 Id. at 1082. 
62 Id. at 1083. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 47 U.S.C. § 153(24) (2018). 
66 See Cooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 7, at 327–28. 
67 In the Matter of Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations (Second 
Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 434 (1980). 
68 In the Matter of Computer III Remand Proceedings, 6 FCC Rcd. 174, 181 (1990). 
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and uniformity may be necessary to enable the enhanced services market to develop 
in the way that both state commissions and this Commission desire.”69 
As the Internet developed, the Commission “formalize[d a] policy of 
nonregulation” of information services “to ensure that Internet applications 
remain[ed] insulated from unnecessary and harmful economic regulation at both the 
federal and state levels.”70 It rested this policy on both the Computer III inquiry and 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, in which Congress expressed a national policy 
“to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the 
Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation.”71 The Commission explained that “[p]assage of the 1996 Act increases 
substantially the likelihood that any state attempt to impose economic regulation of 
[Internet-based information services] would conflict with federal policy.”72 
When challenged, the Commission has successfully defended this preemptive 
deregulation policy. In 2003, the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission ordered 
VoIP provider Vonage to comply with state regulations governing the provision of 
intrastate telephone service.73 Like most VoIP providers, Vonage provided a voice 
communication product that communicated over the Internet rather than through 
traditional telephone lines, and therefore operated as a substitute for traditional 
telephone service.74 Vonage successfully petitioned the FCC to preempt the 
Minnesota order.75 The Commission held that, if Vonage’s VoIP product was an 
information service, preemption was appropriate under the “impossibility 
exception,” which allows the Commission to preempt state regulation where it is 
impossible or impractical to separate a service into interstate and intrastate 
components, and where the state regulation interferes with a valid federal rule or 
                                                          
 
69 Id. 
70 In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Ruling that Pulver.com’s Free World Dialup is Neither 
Telecommunications Nor Telecommunications Service, 19 FCC Rcd. 3307, 3307 (2004). 
71 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2018). This is one of very few times the 1996 Act mentioned the Internet at all. 
72 Pulver.com, 19 FCC Rcd. at 3318. 
73 Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. FCC, 483 F.3d 570, 576 (8th Cir. 2007). VoIP provides voice service 
using packet-switching technology conveyed via the Internet, rather than circuit-switching over the 
traditional telephone network. 
74 Id. at 574–76. 
75 Id. at 576. 
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policy.76 In this case, the Commission explained that any state regulation of an 
information service would conflict with the federal policy of nonregulation.77 The 
Eighth Circuit upheld this decision, finding that “[c]ompetition and deregulation are 
valid federal interests the FCC may protect through preemption of state regulation.”78 
As late as 2018, the court reiterated its holding (in another Minnesota VoIP case) 
that “any state regulation of an information service conflicts with the federal policy 
of nonregulation, so that such regulation is preempted by federal law.”79 
D. Broadband Regulation 
1. Classifying and Reclassifying Broadband Service 
The net neutrality saga is inextricably intertwined with the Commission’s 
indecision about the proper regulatory classification of broadband service. In the late 
1990s, telephone-based Digital Subscriber Line (“DSL”) service and cable modem 
service emerged as competitive alternatives to traditional dial-up Internet access.80 
DSL was saddled with unbundling restrictions, vestigial remains of the Computer II 
and Computer III eras that required the telephone company to offer basic transport 
to nonfacilities-based Internet service providers.81 Other than these requirements, 
however, the Commission deliberately chose not to classify broadband access under 
the Communications Act,82 preferring to allow this new technology to develop free 
from regulatory burdens. The city of Portland, Oregon rushed to fill this regulatory 
void in 1998, classifying cable modem service as “cable service” under the Act so as 
to attach an open access condition to AT&T Broadband in connection with the city’s 
                                                          
 
76 Id. The Commission declined to decide whether VoIP is properly classified as a Title II 
telecommunications service or a Title I information service, as either way, state regulation would interfere 
with a valid federal objective. Id. The court agreed. Id. at 574. 
77 Id. at 580. 
78 Id. 
79 Charter Advanced Servs. (MN) LLC v. Lange, 903 F.3d 715, 718 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Minn. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n, 483 F.3d at 580). In this case, the court acknowledged the FCC’s deliberate ambiguity 
regarding whether VoIP is a telecommunications or information service, and conducted its own analysis 
to determine that information service was more appropriate. Id. at 719. 
80 See Applications for Consent to Transfer Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from 
MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp. Transferee, 15 FCC Rcd. 9816, 9862–63 (discussing 
the state of competition in 2000). 
81 See In the Matters of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853, 14869 (2005) (discussing prior regulatory framework). 
82 See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We note at the outset that the 
FCC has declined, both in its regulatory capacity and as amicus curiae, to address the issue before us.”). 
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approval of a merger between that company and Tele-Communications Incorporated 
(“TCI”).83 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit invalidated this classification, finding that 
cable modem service did not fit the Act’s definition of “cable service” and was better 
classified as a Title II telecommunications service.84 
Its hand having thus been forced, the Commission issued a declaratory ruling 
classifying cable modem service as a Title I information service.85 The Supreme 
Court upheld this distinction in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Services,86 finding under the Chevron87 doctrine that the statute was 
ambiguous regarding whether cable modem service should be classified as an 
information service or a telecommunications service, and that the agency’s 
determination was reasonable.88 The agency then quickly classified DSL service,89 
wireless broadband,90 and broadband over power lines91 as information services as 
well, to promote regulatory parity. 
At the same time, the Commission took steps to signal that its classification did 
not signal an abandonment of consumer protection measures. The 2005 DSL 
reclassification decision included a nonbinding policy statement guaranteeing 
consumers the right to access content, applications, and services of their choice, 
using the device of their choice.92 It also stated that consumers are entitled to 
competition among service providers.93 In 2010, the Commission imposed net 
                                                          
 
83 Id. at 875. 
84 Id. at 876, 878. 
85 In the Matter of Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 
17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802–03 (2002). 
86 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
87 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
88 Id. at 974. 
89 See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 
14853 (2005). 
90 See In the Matters of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14986 (2005). 
91 In the Matter of United Power Line Council’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the 
Classification of Broadband Over Power Line Internet Access Service as an Information Service, 21 FCC 
Rcd. 13281 (2006). 
92 Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access, 20 FCC Rcd. at 14986. 
93 Id. 
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neutrality conditions on broadband providers using its Title I authority,94 which was 
later struck down by the D.C. Circuit in Verizon v. FCC.95 The court found that net 
neutrality restrictions, most notably the Commission’s prohibitions on blocking and 
paid prioritization, amounted to common carriage, which the Communications Act 
prohibited the agency from placing on noncommon-carrier networks.96 The 
Commission responded in 2015 by reclassifying broadband service as a Title II 
telecommunications service (thus making broadband a common-carrier network 
under the Act) and re-imposing net neutrality restrictions on broadband providers, a 
decision upheld by the D.C. Circuit in United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC.97 Two 
years later, the Commission repealed that Order, restoring the pre-2015 classification 
of broadband providers as information services.98 
2. Broadband Regulation and Preemption Provisions 
While the Commission flip-flopped on the proper regulatory classification for 
broadband, it has been consistent in its stance that broadband regulation is a matter 
for federal, not state, authorities. The 2010 Order explained that the Commission had 
authority to preempt state regulations that interfere with valid federal objectives and 
announced that it would consider preemption issues on a case-by-case basis.99 The 
2015 Order was more explicit: although the order reclassified broadband service as 
a Title II telecommunications service, thus subjecting broadband to the shared-
jurisdiction regulatory scheme governing telephony, the Commission “announce[d] 
our firm intention to exercise our preemption authority to preclude states from 
imposing obligations on broadband service that are inconsistent with the carefully 
tailored regulatory scheme we adopt in this Order.”100 The Commission warned that 
it “has used preemption to protect federal interests when a state regulation conflicts 
with federal rules or policies, and we intend to exercise this authority to preempt any 
                                                          
 
94 In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet: Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 
(2010). 
95 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
96 Id. at 655; see 47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (2018) (“A telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a common 
carrier under this chapter only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications services.”). 
97 U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
98 In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 312 (2018). 
99 Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC at 17970 n.374. 
100 In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5804 (2015). The 
order also explicitly preempted state attempts to impose USF contribution requirements on broadband 
providers. Id. at 5803. 
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state regulations which conflict with this comprehensive regulatory scheme or other 
federal law,” and cited in particular hypothetical state efforts to “restrict entry into 
the broadband market through certification requirements or regulate the rates of 
broadband Internet access service through tariffs.”101 
This language seems designed to assuage fears that the imposition of common 
carriage would bring a Bell-era regulatory structure to broadband providers, 
including potentially significant state-level oversight. The Commission was 
concerned about the accusation that it was “regulating the Internet,” and this may 
have been a way to signal its desire to create a Title II-lite regime that would merely 
provide a firm legal basis to impose the net neutrality restrictions that the D.C. 
Circuit had blocked in Verizon.102 
Notably, this preemption provision might not have been bulletproof. By 
reclassifying broadband under Title II, the Commission opened the door to two 
potential realms of state authority that, statutorily, the agency could not reach. First, 
under Section 2(b), the Commission is forbidden from regulating purely intrastate 
transmissions.103 An enterprising state regulator could have attempted to identify and 
regulate purely intrastate broadband communications or services. This would have 
been complicated, however, by the Commission’s finding that intrastate service 
could not be separated from interstate service and, therefore, that regulation of 
intrastate traffic was preempted by the impossibility exemption. Second, Section 
332(c) preserves state regulatory authority over “other terms and conditions” of 
commercial mobile radio service.104 This would have given states some jurisdiction 
to regulate wireless broadband service in particular, if the regulation could be 
classified as consumer protection or could otherwise fit the statutory carveout. While 
these potential founts of authority were theoretically available, state regulators did 
not take advantage of the opportunity to exercise this authority during the two years 
that broadband was classified as a Title II service.105 
                                                          
 
101 Id. at 5804. 
102 See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
103 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1934). 
104 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(a) (2018). 
105 At a trade show in 2016, I personally asked a panel of state regulators whether they had ever discussed 
using this new authority made available by reclassification. I received several glances ranging from 
puzzlement to bemusement, and a uniform assurance that such possibilities were not being seriously 
considered. 
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Like the 2015 Open Internet Order, the 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order 
expressly preempts “any state or local measures that would effectively impose rules 
or requirements” that the order repealed or rules that would otherwise be 
“inconsistent with the federal deregulatory approach” taken in the Order.106 
Specifically, the Order preempts “any so-called ‘economic’ or ‘public utility-type’ 
regulations, including common-carriage requirements akin to those found in Title II” 
of the Communications Act.107 Notably, it also contains a savings clause: the Order 
“do[es] not disturb or displace the states’ traditional role in generally policing such 
matters as fraud, taxation, and general commercial dealings, so long as the 
administration of such general state laws does not interfere with federal regulatory 
objectives.”108 
II. STATE NET NEUTRALITY INITIATIVES 
This section analyzes the response by state lawmakers to the 2017 Restoring 
Internet Freedom Order. The Trump-era FCC’s decision to repeal the 2015 Open 
Internet Order prompted a significant backlash among net neutrality supporters. The 
notice of proposed rulemaking drew over 22 million comments, the largest by far in 
any agency proceeding, although there is significant doubt about the veracity of 
many of these submissions.109 The weeks leading up to the final vote were marked 
by both fever-pitch advocacy on social media and an unfortunate campaign of 
personal attacks on FCC Chairman Ajit Pai and his family.110 The final vote was 
                                                          
 
106 In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 427 (2018). 
107 Id. at 428. 
108 Id. 
109 See Glenn Fleishman, FCC Chair Ajit Pai Admits Millions of Russian and Fake Comments Distorted 
Net Neutrality Repeal, FORTUNE (Dec. 5, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/12/05/fcc-fraud-comments-
chair-admits/. Specifically, over a half-million submissions were traced to Russian email accounts, while 
nearly 8 million nearly identical comments were likely submitted by spambots. Id. Even discounting the 
total figure by 75%, however, this would still be the largest number of comments ever filed in an agency 
proceeding. Id. 
110 See, e.g., April Glaser, Racist, Threatening Attacks on FCC Chair Ajit Pai Won’t Save Net Neutrality, 
SLATE (Nov. 27, 2017), https://slate.com/technology/2017/11/racist-threatening-attacks-on-fcc-chair-ajit 
-pai-won-t-save-net-neutrality.html. One man later pleaded guilty to threatening Chairman Pai and his 
family by email. See John Eggerton, Pai Hails Guilty Plea Over Threats to His Family, MULTICHANNEL 
NEWS (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.multichannel.com/news/pai-hails-guilty-plea-over-threats-to-his-
family. He cited opposition to net neutrality as his motivation for making the threat. Id. 
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briefly delayed when a bomb threat was phoned in to the Commission during its 
monthly open meeting.111 
After the order repealing net neutrality passed, advocates looked for new ways 
to challenge the agency’s decision, and they found willing allies in state governors’ 
offices and legislatures. Over the next nine months, a series of state-level initiatives 
were developed to restore net neutrality at the state level, despite the seemingly 
robust preemption provision contained in the Order. This section summarizes those 
initiatives and handicaps their chances of success in the Restoring Internet Freedom 
litigation. 
A. Executive Orders 
State net neutrality initiatives have come in two basic flavors, the first being 
executive orders. Governors in six states—Montana,112 New York,113 New Jersey,114 
Vermont,115 Rhode Island,116 and Hawaii117—issued executive orders in early 2018 
mandating that state agencies purchase Internet access only from broadband 
providers that adhere to net neutral principles. These executive orders attempted to 
get around the Commission’s preemption provision by substituting the power of the 
purse for direct regulation.118 The executive orders did not mandate that broadband 
providers obey, but required them to voluntarily comply in exchange for eligibility 
to receive a government contract.119 
The six executive orders share many common factors. Perhaps most 
importantly, they all link future government contracts to commitments that Internet 
                                                          
 
111 See John Eggerton, Man Who Made Bomb Threat Against FCC Pleads Guilty, MULTICHANNEL NEWS 
(Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.multichannel.com/news/man-who-made-bomb-threat-against-fcc-pleads-
guilty. 
112 Mont. Exec. Order, supra note 9. 
113 N.Y. Exec. Order, supra note 9. 
114 N.J. Exec. Order, supra note 9. 
115 Vt. Exec. Order, supra note 9. 
116 R.I. Exec. Order, supra note 9. 
117 Haw. Exec. Order, supra note 9. 
118 See Haw. Exec. Order, supra note 9; Mont. Exec. Order, supra note 9; N.J. Exec. Order, supra note 9; 
N.Y. Exec. Order, supra note 9; R.I. Exec. Order, supra note 9; Vt. Exec. Order, supra note 9. 
119 See Haw. Exec. Order, supra note 9; Mont. Exec. Order, supra note 9; N.J. Exec. Order, supra note 9; 
N.Y. Exec. Order, supra note 9; R.I. Exec. Order, supra note 9; Vt. Exec. Order, supra note 9. 
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Service Providers (“ISPs”) abide by some version of the 2015 Open Internet Order’s 
prohibitions against blocking lawful Internet traffic, throttling traffic, and 
prioritizing traffic in exchange for consideration.120 And, in each order, the operative 
provisions are preceded by a lengthy recitation of “whereas clauses” highlighting the 
importance of an open Internet for both the state and its residents.121 
But there are some important differences as well—most significantly, to whom 
the broadband provider must guarantee net neutral conduct. Montana, New Jersey, 
and Rhode Island require that the broadband provider adhere to net neutrality 
principles “with respect to any consumer in the State . . . including,” but not limited 
to, the State itself.122 
By comparison, while the New York Executive Order contains similar 
language about ensuring net neutrality protections for all New Yorkers, the operative 
clause seems to apply only to services provided directly to the state: “Affected State 
Entities are hereby directed to amend their procurement procedures to ensure that 
Affected State Entities only enter into contracts with ISPs that adhere to net neutrality 
principles and to ensure that internet services provided to Affected State Entities, 
include net neutrality protections.”123 
The Vermont and Hawaii orders are ambiguous regarding whether they reach 
beyond the state’s own broadband contracts to require net neutrality commitments to 
consumers as well. Like New York, Vermont requires that “[a]ll State Agency 
contracts with Internet service providers shall include net neutrality protections.”124 
But it goes on to require that these contracts “specifically state that Internet service 
providers shall not . . . [e]ngage in paid prioritization . . . to any Internet 
                                                          
 
120 See Haw. Exec. Order, supra note 9; Mont. Exec. Order, supra note 9; N.J. Exec. Order, supra note 9; 
N.Y. Exec. Order, supra note 9; R.I. Exec. Order, supra note 9; Vt. Exec. Order, supra note 9. 
121 See Haw. Exec. Order, supra note 9; Mont. Exec. Order, supra note 9; N.J. Exec. Order, supra note 9; 
N.Y. Exec. Order, supra note 9; R.I. Exec. Order, supra note 9; Vt. Exec. Order, supra note 9. 
122 See Mont. Exec. Order, supra note 9, at 2 (“After July 1, 2018, to receive a contract from the State of 
Montana for the provision of telecommunications services, a service provider must not, with respect to 
any consumer in the State of Montana (including but not limited to the State itself) . . . .”); N.J. Exec. 
Order, supra note 9, at 3 (“For purposes of this Order, adherence to ‘net neutrality’ principles means that 
an ISP shall not, with respect to any consumers in New Jersey (including but not limited to State 
entities) . . . .”); R.I. Exec. Order, supra note 9, at 3 (“For purposes of this Order, adherence to ‘net 
neutrality principles’ means that a service provider shall not, with respect to any consumer in the State of 
Rhode Island (including the state itself) . . . .”). 
123 N.Y. Exec. Order, supra note 9, at 2. 
124 Vt. Exec. Order, supra note 9, at 1. 
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customer.”125 Because the Order does not define “customer,” it is unclear whether 
this restriction requires that the ISP guarantee only that it will not engage in paid 
prioritization with regard to State Agency traffic, or whether it instead requires the 
ISP to certify that it does not engage in paid prioritization with regard to service to 
any Vermont resident (or indeed, any customer worldwide).126 Similarly, Hawaii’s 
Executive Order directs “all State government agencies to contract Internet-related 
services only with ISPs who demonstrate and contractually agree to support and 
practice net neutrality principles where all Internet traffic is treated equally,” but 
does not clarify whether those contractual commitments are limited to the state’s 
own contracts or extend to individual consumer contracts as well.127 
The six executive orders also differ with regard to what ISP conduct is 
prohibited. All six executive orders require commitments that ISPs not block or 
throttle lawful Internet traffic or engage in paid prioritization, and four of the six 
include the FCC’s prohibition against unreasonably interfering with or 
disadvantaging the ability of consumers and edge providers to communicate with 
one another.128 Montana and New Jersey also require ISPs to publicly disclose their 
network management practices and performance metrics sufficient for consumers to 
make an informed choice among providers.129 New York and Hawaii prohibit all 
prioritization, not just paid prioritization,130 which could affect the state’s ability to 
participate in FirstNet, a nationwide telecommunications network that prioritizes 
First Responder traffic in the event of emergencies.131 New York also prevents ISPs 
from requiring “that end users pay different or higher rates to access specific types 
of content or applications,” which could eliminate practices such as zero-rating.132 
                                                          
 
125 Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
126 Id. 
127 Haw. Exec. Order, supra note 9, at 2. 
128 See Haw. Exec. Order, supra note 9; Mont. Exec. Order, supra note 9; N.J. Exec. Order, supra note 9; 
N.Y. Exec. Order, supra note 9; R.I. Exec. Order, supra note 9; Vt. Exec. Order, supra note 9. 
129 Mont. Exec. Order, supra note 9, at 2; N.J. Exec. Order, supra note 9, at 3–4. 
130 Haw. Exec. Order, supra note 9, at 3; N.Y. Exec. Order, supra note 9, at 2. 
131 See Stephen Klein, Rural Response: The Need for an Effective Rural FirstNet Network, 69 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 53, 62 (2017) (“The priority nature of FirstNet is designed to prevent the general public from using 
the network during an emergency, allowing first responders to use the network without the aforementioned 
overload issues.”). 
132 N.Y. Exec. Order, supra note 9, at 2. 
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Hawaii requires that ISPs “treat all data on the Internet the same,” which could have 
significant unintended consequences beyond zero-rating.133 
These executive orders differ slightly in miscellaneous other ways as well. For 
example, Vermont and Rhode Island explicitly state that their executive orders shall 
not be construed to supersede any federal law, suggesting those states do not intend 
to challenge the Restoring Internet Freedom Order directly.134 They also contain 
procedures by which an individual ISP may seek waiver of the order’s 
requirements.135 
B. State Legislation 
Net neutrality advocates have also found a favorable reception in some state 
legislatures. Four states—California, Oregon, Washington, and Vermont—have 
adopted statutes to regulate broadband providers’ network management practices.136 
The Oregon and Vermont statutes resemble the executive orders discussed above in 
that they attempt to do an end-run around the Restoring Internet Freedom Order by 
using procurement law to entice broadband providers to adopt net-neutral 
practices.137 The Washington and California statutes, however, represent direct 
assaults on the Commission, imposing requirements more burdensome than (and in 
direct contravention of) the Commission’s Restoring Internet Freedom Order.138 In 
fact, California’s SB822 imposes duties that even the 2015 Open Internet Order 
refrained from mandating.139 These statutes are summarized below. 
1. Oregon 
Oregon HB 4155, signed into law on April 10, 2018, prohibits any “public 
body” from contracting with a broadband provider that blocks or throttles lawful 
Internet traffic, engages in paid prioritization, or unreasonably interferes with or 
                                                          
 
133 Haw. Exec. Order, supra note 9, at 3. 
134 Vt. Exec. Order, supra note 9, at 2; R.I. Exec. Order, supra note 9, at 5. Rhode Island also provides 
that the order shall not supersede an ISP’s obligations to public safety and law enforcement. Id. at 4. 
135 Vt. Exec. Order, supra note 9, at 2; R.I. Exec. Order, supra note 9, at 4. 
136 See S.B. 822, Sen. Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2018); H.B. 4155, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2018); S. 
289, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018); H.B. 2282, 65th Leg. Sess. (Wa. 2018). 
137 See H.B. 4155, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2018); S. 289, Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018). 
138 See S.B. 822, Sen. Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2018); H.B. 2282, 65th Leg. Sess. (Wa. 2018). 
139 See text accompanying notes 151–55, infra. 
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disadvantages efforts by end users and edge providers to reach one another.140 
Interestingly, the act applies not only to subdivisions of the state government, but 
also to local governments throughout the state.141 To soften the impact on rural 
governments, the act contains an exception if the broadband provider is the sole fixed 
broadband provider in the geographic area to be covered by the contract.142 It also 
allows the state public utility commission to certify exceptions to the blocking, 
throttling, and unreasonable interference prohibitions (but not the paid prioritization 
ban) for reasonable network management as defined by the statute—an approach that 
parallels the exceptions that were available under the 2015 Open Internet Order.143 
2. Vermont 
Vermont’s S289 similarly conditions government broadband contracts on a 
commitment to abide by net neutral principles. Under the act, state government 
contracts for Internet access must include a certification from the Secretary of 
Administration that the broadband provider discloses its network management 
practices and does not engage in blocking, throttling, paid prioritization, 
unreasonable interference, or deceptive or misleading marketing practices in the 
state.144 The certification process allows the state to waive the paid prioritization 
prohibition if the Secretary finds that the practice would provide a significant public 
benefit and would not harm the Open Internet in Vermont.145 The act also requires 
the Attorney General to conduct a net neutrality study and creates a connectivity 
initiative to prioritize and fund broadband buildout into unserved and underserved 
areas.146 
3. Washington 
Washington’s statute, HB2282, effectively enacts much of the repealed 2015 
Open Internet Order for service within the state of Washington. The act prohibits 
broadband providers in the state from blocking or throttling lawful Internet traffic, 
subject to reasonable network management, and from engaging in paid 
                                                          
 
140 H.B. 4155, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1(3) (Or. 2018). 
141 Id.; see ORS 174.109 (defining “public body”). 
142 H.B. 4155, 79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 4(a) (Or. 2018). 
143 Id. § 3(d); see In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015). 
144 S. 289, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2(b)(1)(A–E) (Vt. 2018). 
145 Id. § 2(c). 
146 Id. §§ 9–10. 
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prioritization.147 Interestingly, the bill did not import the Open Internet Order’s 
unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard. The act also requires broadband 
providers to disclose their network management practices to facilitate informed 
choices by consumers and small business owners.148 
4. California 
The California Internet Consumer Protection and Net Neutrality Act is the most 
aggressive state net neutrality statute passed in 2018.149 Like Washington, the 
California statute effectively requires broadband providers within the state to adhere 
to the 2015 Open Internet Order’s prohibitions on blocking, throttling, and paid 
prioritization.150 Unlike Washington, California also codified the Open Internet 
Order’s unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard.151 But the California 
statute goes further, adopting several requirements that the Open Internet Order had 
declined to enact. These include: 
● Zero-Rating: California prohibits broadband providers from zero-rating 
content (exempting some Internet traffic from a customer’s monthly data 
allowance) for consideration, and from zero-rating some Internet content 
or applications but not an entire category.152 The 2015 Open Internet 
Order declined to address zero-rating (which it called “sponsored data”), 
preferring instead to examine issues on a case-by-case basis under the 
unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard.153 
● Interconnection: California prohibits broadband providers from entering 
into traffic exchange agreements that have the purpose or effect of 
evading the statute’s restrictions.154 It also prohibits payment from an 
edge provider in exchange for delivery of traffic to end-users (or to avoid 
having its service blocked or degraded), effectively setting a rate of zero 
                                                          
 
147 H.B. 2282, 65th Leg. Sess. § 1(a)–(c) (Wa. 2018). 
148 H.B. 2282, 65th Leg. Sess. § 1 (Wa. 2018). 
149 S.B. 822, Sen. Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2018). 
150 Id. § 3101(a)(1); Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601. 
151 S.B. 822, Sen. Reg. Sess. § 3101(a)(7)(A) (Ca. 2018); Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 
FCC Rcd. 5601. 
152 S.B. 822, Sen. Reg. Sess. § 3101(a)(6) (Ca. 2018). 
153 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5668. 
154 S.B. 822, Sen. Reg. Sess. § 3101(a)(9) (Ca. 2018). 
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for direct interconnection agreements (such as a broadband provider 
might enter into with Netflix’s Open Connect content delivery 
network).155 By comparison the Open Internet Order explicitly declined 
to apply its rules to Internet traffic exchange agreements, choosing instead 
to review interconnection complaints against broadband providers under 
a just and reasonable standard.156 
III. LIMITS ON STATE BROADBAND REGULATION 
As the history of telecommunications federalism suggests, these state 
regulatory efforts are likely to encounter opposition from their federal counterparts. 
Indeed, Vermont and California have already been sued to enjoin their net neutrality 
efforts.157 This section examines the limits that federal law places on state efforts to 
regulate broadband networks. 
A. Express Preemption Under the Restoring Internet Freedom 
Order 
In the Vermont and California litigation, the plaintiffs assert that the Restoring 
Internet Freedom Order expressly preempts the statutes and executive order in 
question.158 As discussed above, the Commission’s Order preempts “any state or 
local measures that would effectively impose rules or requirements” that the Order 
repealed, that would “impose more stringent requirements for any aspect of 
broadband service” than addressed in the Order, or that would otherwise be 
“inconsistent with the federal deregulatory approach that we adopt today.”159 
Specifically, the Order preempts “any so-called ‘economic’ or ‘public utility-type’ 
regulations, including common-carriage requirements akin to those found in Title II” 
of the Communications Act.160 
Given the scope of this preemption provision, it is difficult to argue that these 
state initiatives do not “effectively impose rules or requirements” that the FCC 
                                                          
 
155 Id. § 3101(a)(3). 
156 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5693. 
157 See ACA v. Scott, No. 2:18-cv-00167 (D. Vt., filed Oct. 18, 2018); United States v. California, No. 
2:18-at-01539 (E.D. Cal., filed Sept. 30, 2018). 
158 Scott, No. 2:18-cv-00167, at 6; California, No. 2:18-at-01539, at 2. 
159 In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 427 (2018). 
160 Id. at 428. 
S T A T E  N E T  N E U T R A L I T Y   
 
P A G E  |  9 2 9   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2019.657 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
“repealed or decided to refrain from imposing.”161 This is particularly true of the 
Washington and California statutes, which directly regulate broadband access.162 
Both statutes codified the blocking, throttling, and prioritization provisions (and, in 
California, the unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard) that the Restoring 
Internet Freedom Order explicitly abolished.163 Moreover, California’s 
interconnection and zero-rating restrictions “impose more stringent requirements” 
on broadband service than mandated by either the current or prior FCC Orders, and 
the statute also imposes significant duties on non-broadband services provided over 
the same broadband network.164 Indeed, the states have largely admitted as much. 
For example, Vermont’s statute includes a finding that the Restoring Internet 
Freedom Order “is unlikely to achieve the intended results in Vermont” and 
explicitly endorsed instead the Open Internet Order, which the Commission has 
disavowed.165 Similarly, the Senate Committee Report on the California bill 
acknowledged that the act both “codif[ies] portions of the recently-rescinded [FCC] 
rules,” and imposes additional obligations beyond event the 2015 Order.166 
The Hobbs Act prevents the states from challenging the validity of the FCC’s 
preemption clause in the existing Vermont and California cases. The Hobbs Act vests 
exclusive jurisdiction in the Circuit Courts of Appeal to “enjoin, set aside, suspend 
(in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of” FCC orders.167 This means that 
“[p]roperly promulgated FCC regulations currently in effect must be presumed 
valid,” as district courts “lack[] jurisdiction to pass on the validity” of FCC orders.168 
Relying on the Hobbs Act, the plaintiffs (several trade groups representing 
broadband providers in the Vermont case, and the United States in the California 
case) have moved for summary judgment or sought to enjoin the state provision at 
                                                          
 
161 Id. 
162 See S.B. 822, Sen. Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2018); H.B. 2282, 65th Leg. Sess. (Wa. 2018). 
163 See S.B. 822, Sen. Reg. Sess. § 3101 (Ca. 2018); H.B. 2282, 65th Leg. Sess. § 2 (Wa. 2018); Restoring 
Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. at 312. 
164 S.B. 822, Sen. Reg. Sess. § 3102(a) (Ca. 2018). 
165 S. 289, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1(10) (Vt. 2018). 
166 CAL. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., 2017–2018 REG. SESS., COMMUNICATIONS: BROADBAND INTERNET 
ACCESS SERVICE 1, 19 (2018) (analysis of S.B. 822). 
167 Jurisdiction of Court of Appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (2012). 
168 U.S. West Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jennings, 304 F.3d 950, 958 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002); see also FCC v. ITT 
World Commc’ns, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 468 (1984) (“Litigants may not evade” the Hobbs Act by arguing 
in district court that “FCC action is ultra vires.”). 
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issue, prompting both states voluntarily to stay the implementation of their net 
neutrality statutes.169 
This satellite litigation does not, however, answer the important question of 
whether the Commission’s preemption provision is valid. It merely shifts the venue 
to the D.C. Circuit, where 22 states have joined a host of private petitioners 
challenging the validity of the Restoring Internet Freedom Order.170 At first glance, 
the Order’s preemption provision seems consistent with the Commission’s 
longstanding policy of preemptive deregulation of information services, as discussed 
above. As early as the Computer II inquiry, the Commission recognized that 
regulation of information services would “restrict[] this fast-moving, competitive 
market,”171 and in Computer III preempted state law that would interfere with this 
deregulatory project.172 In the 2004 Pulver Free World Dialup inquiry, the 
Commission acknowledged this long-standing “policy of nonregulation to ensure 
that Internet applications remain insulated from unnecessary and harmful economic 
regulation at both the federal and state levels”173 and formally preempted any state 
regulation of information services that would “conflict with our policy of 
nonregulation.”174 As noted above, the Eighth Circuit upheld this policy in 2007, 
explaining that “deregulation” is a “valid interest[] the FCC may protect through 
preemption of state regulation,”175 a conclusion it reiterated last year.176 
But the state petitioners have challenged whether this general policy is 
sufficient to support the specific preemption clause contained in the Restoring 
                                                          
 
169 See Maura Dolan, California Agrees to Put Its New Net Neutrality Law Temporarily On Hold, L.A. 
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-net-neutrality-court-20181026-
story.html; Jon Brodkin, ISPs Strike Deal with Vermont to Suspend State Net Neutrality Law, ARS 
TECHNICA (Mar. 15, 2019), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/03/isps-strike-deal-with-vermont-
to-suspend-state-net-neutrality-law/. 
170 Mozilla v. FCC, No. 18-1051 (D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 20, 2018). 
171 In the Matter of Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations (Second 
Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 434 (1980). 
172 In the Matter of Computer III Remand Proceedings, 6 FCC Rcd. 174, 181 (1990). 
173 In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Ruling that Pulver.com’s Free World Dialup is Neither 
Telecommunications Nor Telecommunications Service, 19 FCC Rcd. 3307, 3307 (2004). 
174 Id. at 3316 (emphasis added). 
175 Minn. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, v. FCC, 483 F.3d 570, 580 (8th Cir. 2007). 
176 Charter Advanced Servs. (MN) LLC v. Lange, 903 F.3d 715, 718 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Minn. Pub. 
Utilities Comm’n, 483 F.3d at 580). 
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Internet Freedom Order.177 Their argument is that in the Order, the Commission 
interpreted the Communications Act to prevent the agency from regulating 
broadband service altogether.178 The Order disclaims authority to regulate broadband 
under Title II, which provided legal jurisdiction for the 2015 Open Internet Order.179 
While the Communications Act provides the Commission with general jurisdiction 
under Title I over all interstate communication via wire or radio, the Supreme Court 
has held that the Commission can only rely on this jurisdiction to enact rules that are 
“reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission’s various 
responsibilities” under the Communications Act.180 In the 2010 Open Internet Order, 
the Commission found that Title I broadband regulation was reasonably ancillary to 
its authority under Section 706 to promote the rapid deployment of broadband, but 
the Restoring Internet Freedom Order found that Section 706 is not, in fact, a grant 
of regulatory authority to the Commission.181 Petitioners argue that, having 
disclaimed authority under Section 706, the agency failed to identify a jurisdictional 
hook upon which to hang its Title I ancillary authority to regulate broadband—and 
therefore that it similarly lacks jurisdiction to preempt state broadband regulation.182 
The Order anchors its preemption authority in two provisions, but neither are 
fully convincing.183 First, the Commission argues that under Section 2, it may 
preempt state law when it is impossible or impracticable to regulate the intrastate 
portion of a service without affecting the interstate component.184 While the 
impossibility exception has a lengthy pedigree in telecommunications federalism, it 
applies only when “state regulation would conflict with federal rules or policies.”185 
                                                          
 
177 See Proof Brief for Government Petitioners, Mozilla v. FCC, No. 18–1051, at 39 (D.C. Cir, filed 
Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/mozilla-fcc.pdf. 
178 Id. 
179 In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 312 (2018). 
180 United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). 
181 Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. at 316, 470. 
182 See Mozilla v. FCC Brief, supra note 177, at 39. 
183 While there may be other arguments available to support the agency’s preemption clause, the agency 
is generally prohibited from offering alternative rationales for its action that are not contained in the 
agency’s order. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
184 Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. at 429; see La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 
360–61 (1986) (recognizing impossibility exception). 
185 Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. FCC, 483 F.3d 570, 574 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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Because the test requires the Commission to identify a federal rule or policy, it seems 
that it cannot itself serve as a rule or policy for purposes of express preemption. 
Second, the Commission relies on the federal policy of nonregulation of 
information services.186 But that is likely insufficient under D.C. Circuit law to 
constitute an assertion of Title I authority to support express preemption. In Comcast 
Corp. v. FCC, the court struck down the Commission’s attempt to fine Comcast for 
interfering with BitTorrent traffic in violation of its Internet policy statement.187 The 
court held that the agency could not assert its Title I ancillary authority to regulate 
broadband practices unless it could tie the action to enforcement of a statutorily 
mandated responsibility—and that statements of policy were insufficient.188 
Similarly, it is unlikely that the assertion of a general policy of nonregulation of 
information services, untethered to a statutorily mandated responsibility elsewhere 
in the statute, will constitute an exercise of Title I ancillary authority to support 
express preemption. As a result, the state petitioners have a strong argument that the 
Order’s express preemption clause is invalid.189 
B. Conflict Preemption With the Restoring Internet Freedom 
Order 
Even if the state petitioners succeed in striking the Order’s express preemption 
clause, individual state net neutrality regulations would nonetheless be vulnerable to 
conflict preemption. Whereas express preemption turns on congressional intent, 
conflict preemption focuses on the effect of dual sovereigns pursuing different 
objectives in an area of shared regulatory authority.190 Conflict preemption occurs 
when it is impossible for a party to comply with state and federal law, or when a state 
law “frustrate[s] the accomplishment of a federal objective.”191 In these cases, the 
                                                          
 
186 Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. at 431. 
187 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
188 Id. at 644. 
189 While the agency may have other arguments that could support express preemption, for purposes of 
the D.C. Circuit case it is limited to arguments that it articulated in its decision below. See SEC v. Chenery 
Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1947). 
190 See Mary J. Davis, On Preemption, Congressional Intent, and Conflict of Laws, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 
181, 183 (2004). 
191 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000). 
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Supremacy Clause itself nullifies the state law—meaning that conflict preemption 
can occur even in the absence of an express preemption statement.192 
To conduct a conflict preemption analysis, one must properly frame the federal 
action in question. The Restoring Internet Freedom Order is best understood as an 
exercise of the agency’s judgment regarding the appropriate federal objective for 
broadband regulation. In Brand X,193 the Supreme Court held that the 
Telecommunications Act’s definitions were ambiguous, and therefore the 
Commission was free to classify broadband Internet access service as either a Title I 
information service or a Title II telecommunications service.194 The scope of the 
agency’s Title I power ranges, based upon how the agency interprets ambiguous 
grants of authority like Section 706 and what rules the agency determines are helpful 
to execute even its clearly defined statutory powers. Similarly, the scope of Title II 
varies, as the statute gives the agency the power to forbear from applying particular 
provisions if the agency determines that “enforcement of the regulation or provision 
is not necessary” or if forbearance is otherwise “consistent with the public 
interest.”195 
This flexibility creates a broad menu of potential regulatory options for the 
agency to choose from, all of which are permissible under the Communications Act 
as interpreted by Brand X.196 On one end of the spectrum, the agency could opt for a 
policy of complete nonregulation, disclaiming any interest in broadband whatsoever. 
On the other end, it could apply the full panoply of Title II obligations to broadband 
providers, up to and including rate regulation pursuant to tariffs filed with the 
Commission. Between these poles lie a host of potential regulatory bundles, 
including minimalist Title I requirements, a more robust common-law regulatory 
structure constructed using a more intensive Title I process, or a Title II-lite regime 
that waives most, some, or virtually none of that chapter’s traditional common 
carriage requirements.197 
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195 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2018). 
196 See Brand X, 545 U.S. 967. 
197 See, e.g., Daniel A. Lyons, Net Neutrality and Nondiscrimination Norms in Telecommunications, 54 
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The Restoring Internet Freedom Order represents the agency’s policy judgment 
regarding the optimal regulatory bundle from among these options. Contrary to 
petitioners’ claim in the Mozilla litigation, the Order did not completely foreswear 
any jurisdiction over broadband access.198 Rather, the agency opted to classify 
broadband as an information service and subject it to specific transparency and 
disclosure obligations.199 But it decided against more intensive common carrier-like 
economic restrictions, because, in its judgment, general consumer protection and 
antitrust remedies provide adequate protection for consumers and more intrusive 
regulations could have adverse effects on consumers and innovation.200 
Courts are likely to find that state net neutrality initiatives “frustrate the 
accomplishment of a federal objective” by imposing duties that the Commission 
explicitly repealed and reducing the flexibility that the Commission recognized as 
important to future growth.201 Where, as here, an agency has adopted a careful 
regulatory scheme that balances trade-offs between more and less onerous 
requirements, states may not upset that balance. 
This case is analogous to Geier v. American Honda Motor Company.202 To 
promote greater highway safety, the Department of Transportation adopted a 
regulation requiring auto manufacturers to equip some, but not all, of their vehicles 
with passive restraints such as airbags.203 The standard deliberately sought a mix of 
different restraints to be phased in over time, and rejected an all-airbag standard 
because of concerns about public backlash.204 The plaintiff, injured in an automobile 
crash, alleged that failure to provide an airbag violated state tort law despite being in 
compliance with the federal standard.205 The Court held that the state tort claim was 
preempted, because a “rule of state tort law imposing a duty to install airbags in cars 
such as petitioners’ would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of 
                                                          
 
198 See Mozilla v. FCC Brief, supra note 177. 
199 In the Matter of Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, 396, 404, 435 (2018). 
200 Id. at 396–97. 
201 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000). 
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devices that the federal regulation sought and to the phase-in that the federal 
regulation deliberately imposed.”206 
Significantly, this conflict preemption does not depend upon the existence of 
an express preemption clause. The regulatory scheme in Geier included a provision 
expressly preempting inconsistent state safety standards.207 The Court held this 
express clause was inapplicable to Geier’s suit because a tort action is not a safety 
standard.208 But the Court explained that the existence of an inapplicable preemption 
provision, “by itself, does not foreclose (through negative implication) ‘any 
possibility of implied [conflict] pre-emption.’”209 Similarly, even if the Mozilla court 
invalidates the Restoring Internet Freedom Order’s express preemption provision, 
individual state net neutrality efforts would be subject to a conflict preemption 
analysis.210 
Moreover, when conducting this analysis, a court will give weight to the 
agency’s own views regarding when state initiatives conflict with the federal 
objective in question. As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he agency is likely to 
have a thorough understanding of its own regulation and its objectives and is 
‘uniquely qualified’ to comprehend the likely impact of state requirements.”211 The 
Restoring Internet Freedom Order clarified that “common-carriage requirements 
akin to those found in Title II,” as well as any other obligation equivalent to “rules 
or requirements that we repeal or refrain from imposing today,” would “pose an 
obstacle to or place an undue burden on the provision of broadband Internet access 
service” and would therefore “conflict with the deregulatory approach we adopt 
today.”212 “In these circumstances,” the Geier Court held, “the agency’s own views 
should make a difference.”213 
Nor can states avoid preemption by substituting the power of the purse for the 
power to regulate directly, as various executive orders and the Oregon and Vermont 
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statutes seek to do.214 The market participant doctrine allows states to attach 
conditions to services that it purchases for its own use.215 But, “courts have found 
preemption when government entities seek to advance general societal goals rather 
than narrow proprietary interests through the use of their contracting power.”216 For 
example, the Supreme Court held that a Wisconsin statute was preempted by federal 
law where the statute in question prohibited the state from contracting with certain 
repeat violators of the National Labor Relations Act, on the ground that the additional 
penalty increased, and therefore conflicted with, the remedial scheme provided under 
the Act.217 The Court found it immaterial that “Wisconsin has chosen to use its 
spending power rather than its police power.”218 That would suggest that executive 
orders such as New York’s (and those of Vermont and Hawaii, if interpreted 
narrowly) would survive a preemption analysis, as they only seek to dictate the terms 
of service within the state’s own contracts with broadband providers.219 Efforts to 
leverage the state’s bargaining power to affect the terms of contracts between 
broadband providers and third parties would, however, be preempted. 
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council is also instructive.220 In the late 
1990s, the federal government enacted a measured set of economic sanctions against 
Burma.221 Massachusetts enacted its own statute that effectively prohibited the state 
from contracting with companies that did business with Burma, even if those 
companies were in compliance with the federal regime.222 Like the net neutrality 
executive orders, the goal was to put pressure on companies to adopt voluntary 
practices that federal law refused to impose directly. Yet the Court unanimously held 
that the Massachusetts law was preempted because it “conflict[ed] with federal law 
                                                          
 
214 See supra text accompanying notes 120–21. 
215 Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City of Bedford, 180 F.3d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The 
Supreme Court has found that when a state or municipality acts as a participant in the market and does so 
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does not constitute regulation subject to preemption.”). 
216 Id. at 692; see also Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282 (1986). 
217 Gould, 475 U.S. at 289. 
218 Id. 
219 N.Y. Exec. Order, supra note 9; Vt. Exec. Order, supra note 9; Haw. Exec. Order, supra note 9. 
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at a number of points by penalizing individuals and conduct that Congress ha[d] 
explicitly exempted or excluded from sanctions” in “clear contrast to the 
congressional scheme.”223 
Importantly, it is unlikely that the Mozilla court will make a blanket 
determination that state net neutrality initiatives are preempted due to conflicts with 
the Restoring Internet Freedom Order. Conflict preemption requires a finding that 
the state rule in question frustrates a federal objective—a determination that the court 
cannot make unless faced with an actual state statute to compare to the federal 
scheme. This means that even if the states succeed, and the Mozilla court strikes 
down the express preemption provision, the Commission or affected parties may 
nonetheless challenge individual state net neutrality initiatives on conflict 
preemption grounds in separate litigation—and the state petitioners conceded as 
much in the Mozilla oral argument. 
C. The Scope of State Authority Under the Communications Act 
if the Restoring Internet Freedom Order is Vacated 
The analysis thus far assumes that the Restoring Internet Freedom Order will 
survive judicial review. But what would happen to state net neutrality initiatives if 
the Mozilla court strikes down the order on other grounds—for example, by finding 
the order arbitrary and capricious without reaching the preemption question—or if a 
future Commission repeals the order? The answer depends in part upon the effect of 
three federal laws: the 2015 Open Internet Order, the mixed-jurisdiction rules, and 
Section 332.224 
1. Open Internet Order 
A repeal of the Restoring Internet Freedom Order would effectively reclassify 
broadband as a Title II service and reimpose the 2015 Open Internet Order. As 
discussed briefly above, the Open Internet Order contains its own preemption 
provision, which “preclude[s] states from imposing obligations on broadband service 
that are inconsistent with the carefully tailored regulatory scheme we adopt in this 
Order.”225 This preemption provision would not affect the core protections contained 
in most existing state net neutrality regimes, including the prohibitions on blocking, 
throttling, and prioritization, and the unreasonable interference/disadvantage 
                                                          
 
223 Id. at 378. 
224 See In the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015); 47 U.S.C. 
§ 332 (2018). 
225 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5601, 5804. 
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standard, all of which states imported from the Open Internet Order. But it would 
strike down those portions of state rules that reach more broadly than the 2015 
Order—most notably California’s regulation of zero-rating practices, 
interconnection, and non-broadband services.226 It would also provide a narrowing 
construction for those state initiatives that are ambiguous but could be read to impose 
more intensive requirements than the Open Internet Order—such as Hawaii’s 
prohibition on all forms of prioritization and its requirement that broadband 
providers “treat all data on the Internet the same.”227 
2. Mixed-Jurisdiction Rules 
The Commission has consistently found that broadband Internet access is 
jurisdictionally interstate for regulatory purposes. Although “broadband Internet 
access traffic may include an intrastate component,”228 “the Internet’s inherently 
global and open architecture enables edge providers to serve content through a 
multitude of distributed origination points, making end-to-end jurisdictional analysis 
extremely difficult—if not impossible—when the services at issue involve the 
Internet.”229 Because it is not possible to separate the interstate and intrastate aspects 
of the service, the service is considered jurisdictionally interstate for regulatory 
purposes, a finding that the Commission made when broadband was classified as a 
Title I service230 and which it explicitly affirmed when it reclassified the services 
under Title II.231 
The classification of broadband as an interstate service does not preclude all 
state regulation of the service.232 But it prevents state regulators from assuming 
                                                          
 
226 Id.; S.B. 822, Sen. Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2018). 
227 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5601, 5804; Haw. Exec. Order, supra 
note 9. 
228 In the Matter of Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs Petition for Clarification or Declaratory 
Ruling that No FCC Order or Rule Limits State Authority to Collect Broadband Data, 25 FCC Rcd. 5051, 
5054 n.24 (2010). 
229 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5803. 
230 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs, 25 FCC Rcd. at 5054, 5054 n.24. 
231 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5803. 
232 Global NAPS, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 444 F.3d 59, 71 (1st Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) 
(“A matter may be subject to FCC jurisdiction, without the FCC having exercised that jurisdiction and 
preempted state regulation.”). 
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plenary authority over intrastate broadband transmissions under Section 2(b).233 And 
under conflict preemption rules, it preempts any state regulations that would be 
incompatible with federal efforts or stand as an obstacle to the implementation of 
valid federal policies.234 The Commission discussed this delicate balance in 
connection with a 2010 petition by the National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners (“NARUC”).235 NARUC sought a declaratory ruling that no FCC 
order limits state authority to collect data from broadband providers.236 The 
Commission reiterated that broadband is jurisdictionally interstate but noted that this 
designation did not “by itself preclude mandatory State data-gathering efforts.”237 It 
suggested that data-gathering did not “inevitably” conflict with a federal objective 
as long as these efforts “supplement, rather than interfere with federal information 
collection efforts,” though it “decline[d] to address the extent of such State 
authority.”238 
This analysis suggests that the mixed jurisdiction rules would allow states to 
enforce laws that hew closely to federal requirements—effectively serving as 
supplementary authorities to augment federal enforcement efforts. If the 
Commission reclassifies broadband providers as Title II common carriers, the mixed 
jurisdiction rules would not preclude states from enforcing requirements similar to 
those the Commission acknowledged as necessary to carry out the federal regime. If, 
however, the Commission retains broadband’s classification as a Title I information 
service and does not soften its long-standing deregulatory policy toward information 
services, most state regulatory efforts are likely to be preempted.239 
                                                          
 
233 See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. at 5803 (“As a general matter, mixed-
jurisdiction services are typically subject to dual federal/state jurisdiction, except where it is impossible 
or impractical to separate the service’s intrastate from interstate components and the state regulation of 
the intrastate component interferes with valid federal rules or policies.”). 
234 Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs, 25 FCC Rcd. at 5053. 
235 Id. at 5051. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 5054. 
238 Id. at 5055. 
239 See Charter Advanced Servs. (MN) LLC v. Lange, 903 F.3d 715, 718 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Minn. 
Pub. Util. Comm’n v. FCC, 483 F.3d 570, 580 (8th Cir. 2007)). 
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3. Section 332 
Section 332 places additional restrictions on state regulation of mobile 
broadband service.240 Whether mobile broadband is classified as a commercial 
mobile radio service (as under the Open Internet Order) or a private mobile radio 
service (as under the Restoring Internet Freedom Order), Section 332 expressly 
preempts attempts to regulate entry or rates charged by mobile providers.241 At a 
minimum, state net neutrality efforts regulate rates, by mandating a charge of zero 
for prioritization. California also regulates rates for zero-rating practices and 
interconnection.242 More generally, mobile providers have a colorable argument that 
laws mandating broadband providers comply with blocking and throttling rules as a 
condition of doing business in the state regulate entry in violation of Section 332. 
States may argue that blocking and throttling restrictions constitute consumer 
protection measures that could fall under Section 332’s carve out for state regulation 
of “other terms and conditions.”243 But this is unlikely to be upheld, as they affect 
rates and, as industry-specific requirements, they go beyond the “neutral application 
of state contractual or consumer fraud laws,” which the FCC has indicated, and 
courts have upheld, as the touchstone for this carve out.244 
D. Dormant Commerce Clause 
Independent of the Communications Act, state regulation of the Internet may 
also run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine prevents states from imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce. It is 
a judge-made doctrine, derived from the negative implication of the Constitution’s 
grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce between the states.245 Its 
“central rationale . . . is to prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is local 
economic protectionism.”246 Thus, state laws that explicitly discriminate against 
                                                          
 
240 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2018). 
241 Id. § 332(c)(3)(a). 
242 S.B. 822, Sen. Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2018). 
243 Cellco P’ship v. Hatch, 431 F.3d 1077, 1082–83 (8th Cir. 2005). 
244 See id. at 1083. 
245 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
246 C&A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, NY, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994). 
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interstate commerce face “a virtually per se rule of invalidity.”247 But even a facially 
nondiscriminatory state law may nonetheless run afoul of the doctrine if it unduly 
burdens interstate commerce. Courts evaluate such claims under the test announced 
in Pike v. Bruce Church: “Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”248 
The Pike balancing test played an important role in shaping early Internet 
regulation, because of concern about spillover effects when states regulate online 
conduct. In the prominent case of American Library Association v. Pataki, a district 
court struck down a New York law that prohibited the intentional use of the Internet 
to send pornographic messages that would be “harmful to minors.”249 The court 
conceded that shielding New York minors from pornography constituted a legitimate 
state interest.250 But it found this interest was outweighed by the significant chilling 
effect the law would have on wholly out-of-state conduct.251 Because information 
posted to the Internet is available everywhere simultaneously, those who disseminate 
information online could face liability for posting content that arguably ran afoul of 
New York’s law, even if they had no intention of communicating with New York 
residents.252 And this, in turn, would chill communication to recipients in states 
where the content was legal, thus imposing an undue burden on interstate commerce 
far in excess of what little local benefits were likely to result from enforcement.253 
Like many balancing tests, the doctrine is somewhat unpredictable, turning on 
the facts of individual cases. Many state regulations create spillover effects; the 
Dormant Commerce Clause only invalidates those that, in the court’s judgment, 
impose a greater burden on interstate commerce than they reap in local benefit—
which can differ from case to case. For example, in National Federation of the Blind 
                                                          
 
247 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091 (2018) (quoting Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 
460, 476, 125 S. Ct. 1885, 161 L. Ed. 2d 796 (2005)). 
248 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
249 American Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
250 Id. at 177. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. at 179–80. 
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v. Target Corp.,254 Target argued that California’s disability law burdened interstate 
commerce by requiring it to modify a nationwide website to meet California 
requirements—which effectively imposed California law on the company’s 
transactions with all customers, even those outside California.255 The court found 
this argument was premature at the motion to dismiss stage, explaining that Target 
could develop a California-specific website, and even if it chose not to do so, its 
decision to develop one product for a nationwide market does not necessarily 
implicate the Commerce Clause.256 At a minimum, factual development was 
necessary to determine the “practical effect” of the law on interstate commerce 
before the court could decide the Dormant Commerce Clause issue.257 
National Federation of the Blind’s focus on practical effects reflects the 
insights of Professors Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes, whose seminal Yale Law 
Journal article, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, brought some 
clarity to this somewhat confusing corner of the law.258 Goldsmith and Sykes 
highlight that the primary justification for the Dormant Commerce Clause is to 
“ensure[] free trade among the states and thereby secure[] the associated economic 
benefits.”259 They thus support the consideration of economic efficiency as the 
lodestar for such claims: “[T]he appropriate statement of the extraterritoriality 
concern is that states may not impose burdens on out-of-state actors that outweigh 
the in-state benefits.”260 
A full application to broadband regulation is beyond the scope of this article. 
But it is worth noting that like early state attempts to regulate online conduct, state-
level network traffic management regulations are susceptible to a Dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge. The Internet is a national (indeed, global) network, 
meaning that attempts to regulate the flow of traffic on that network are likely to 
have extraterritorial effects. If state net neutrality rules survive a preemption analysis, 
states should be ready for the claim that such regulations unreasonably burden 
                                                          
 
254 452 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
255 Id. at 961. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. at 962. 
258 Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 
785 (2001). 
259 Id. at 795. 
260 Id. at 804. 
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interstate commerce and, therefore, contravene the Dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine. 
The party challenging the law bears the burden of showing the impact on 
interstate commerce.261 As an initial matter, it is not clear that the existing state-level 
net neutrality initiatives are limited to in-state conduct. For example, Vermont’s 
executive order prevents state agencies from contracting for broadband service 
unless the broadband provider certifies that it does not “engage in paid 
prioritization . . . to any Internet customer.”262 Similarly, Hawaii requires agencies 
to contract only with providers that “demonstrate and contractually agree to support 
and practice net neutrality principles where all Internet traffic is treated equally.”263 
Facially, these restrictions can be read to apply not only to contracts with in-state 
consumers, but with all consumers nationwide (or indeed worldwide).264 
But even if the court construes these restrictions to apply only to contracts with 
in-state consumers, such regulations can disrupt the orderly flow of interstate traffic. 
Permissible network management practices would differ from state to state, 
depending on whether and how each state chose to regulate. Even if all states adopted 
facially identical statutes, fragmentation is likely to occur over time as fifty different 
sovereigns may reasonably disagree on enforcement. For example, what constitutes 
“reasonable network management” may differ from state to state. Broadband 
providers are thus left with two alternatives: operate a nationwide network that meets 
the standards of the most stringent state—meaning that state’s law burdens out-of-
state communications that would otherwise be legal—or balkanize the network and 
make the delivery of network traffic less efficient, which burdens the delivery of out-
of-state communications. Similar burdens on out-of-state traffic undergirded the 
Pataki decision, and while National Federation of the Blind was less sympathetic to 
such claims, it did not discard them outright—rather, the court withheld judgment 
until the magnitude of the burden could be quantified. 
                                                          
 
261 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). 
262 Vt. Exec. Order, supra note 9. 
263 Haw. Exec. Order, supra note 9. 
264 It is worth noting that the executive orders, and two of the four statutes, do not regulate broadband 
providers directly, but instead require them to commit to net neutral practices as a condition of receiving 
government contracts. This is an attempt to fit these regulations into the market participant doctrine, which 
is an exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. But because most of these initiatives reach 
beyond the terms of the state’s own contracts, and instead attempt to regulate contracts between broadband 
providers and third-party consumers, they fall outside the market participant doctrine, as discussed above. 
See text accompanying notes 214–23, supra. 
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Once plaintiffs have established that a law burdens interstate commerce, the 
burden shifts to the state to establish the local benefit.265 Many states have been 
careful to rehearse the benefits they claim from net neutrality regulations. The 
Vermont statute, for example, explains that because the Green Mountain State is “a 
rural state with many geographically remote locations . . . many Vermonters do not 
have the ability to choose easily between Internet Service Providers (ISPs). This lack 
of a thriving competitive market, particularly in isolated areas, disadvantages the 
ability of consumers and businesses to protect their interests sufficiently,” thus 
warranting government regulation.266 Similarly, California’s legislature found that 
“[a]lmost every sector of California’s economy, democracy, and society is dependent 
on the open and neutral Internet that supports vital functions” such as police and 
emergency services, health services, utilities, and education.267 
But these states may struggle to quantify these claimed benefits. As one court 
noted, “to determine what the ‘practical effects’ of the regulation are, courts should 
inquire into the actual effects of the legislation rather than the effects intended by the 
legislature.”268 Similarly, net neutrality skeptics have often cited the dearth of 
evidence that net neutrality rules are necessary to protect consumers from real 
harm—the history of broadband development before the 2015 Open Internet Order 
and since its 2018 repeal suggest otherwise. And while proponents claim that 
regulation can promote other values—such as the 2015 Open Internet Order’s claim 
of a “virtuous cycle” that net neutrality will promote edge investment, which in turn 
will stimulate demand for greater network investment—the evidence supporting 
these claims is equally thin, as Judge Williams noted in his dissent in US Telecom 
Association.269 On the other hand, the majority gave the FCC the benefit of the doubt 
in that case because of the “highly deferential” standard of review governing agency 
                                                          
 
265 USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1281 (2d Cir. 1995). 
266 S. 289, Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2018). 
267 S.B. 822, Sen. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
268 National Federation of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 960; see also Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 
324, 336 (1989) (“The critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct 
beyond the boundaries of the State.”). While the court in that instance was discussing the need to quantify 
the burden on interstate commerce, a proper cost-benefit analysis requires a similar quantification of the 
offsetting benefit, as the Pataki court discusses in depth. 
269 See US Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 754 (2016) (Williams, J., dissenting). 
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predictive judgments in administrative settings, and courts may extend similar 
deference to state legislatures’ conclusion as well.270 
These observations suggest that opponents of state net neutrality initiatives 
have at least a colorable argument that such efforts violate the Dormant Commerce 
Clause. The Internet is a national (indeed, global) network, meaning that state 
attempts to regulate the flow of traffic on that network are likely to have 
extraterritorial effects that burden interstate commerce. As a result, claims that these 
rules contravene the Dormant Commerce Clause could prove an additional obstacle 
for state attempts to resurrect net neutrality restrictions. 
IV. FUTURE OF STATE BROADBAND REGULATION 
A. Optimal Jurisdiction Analysis 
The Dormant Commerce Clause analysis illuminates a broader policy question 
posed by state net neutrality efforts and by federalism issues generally: when is state-
by-state regulation beneficial to consumers, and when is the public best served by a 
single national regulatory model? The answer to this question turns upon the relative 
strengths of federal and local regulation. As Charles Cooper and Brian Koukoutchos 
note, “[o]ne does not lightly displace the regulatory powers of sovereign states.”271 
The recognition of state governments as co-sovereigns is a key feature of “Our 
Federalism”272 and promotes important values such as policy experimentation, 
responsiveness to local concerns, and accountability by public figures who are closer 
to the subjects they govern.273 On the other hand, the existence of the Commerce 
Clause reminds us that there were important policy reasons why the founders adopted 
the Constitution rather than continuing to languish under the defunct Articles of 
Confederation: “[t]he Constitutional Convention was held in 1787 precisely because 
the states had shown themselves to be, by their very nature as separate and competing 
sovereigns, incompetent to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.”274 An optimal 
                                                          
 
270 Cf. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (“In reviewing the 
constitutionality of a statute, courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of 
Congress. Our sole obligation is to assure that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn 
reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.”). 
271 See Cooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 7, at 299. 
272 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
273 See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 53–62 (2004). 
274 Cooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 7, at 300–01. 
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jurisdiction analysis should try to capture the benefits of decentralization while 
minimizing the negative effects that Our Federalism can otherwise generate.275 
Federalism scholars have recognized several reasons supporting a move toward 
centralized authority, two of which are most relevant here. First, preemption brings 
uniformity: it replaces a patchwork of inconsistent standards with a single legal 
regime that operates the same way nationwide.276 Uniformity reduces the transaction 
costs of government compliance, as a company has a single federal interface to seek 
regulatory action, guidance, or exemption, rather than having to lobby fifty or more 
independent decisionmakers.277 Uniformity also reduces uncertainty: a company can 
enter a regional or national market knowing the legal framework that will govern the 
service throughout the market, with less fear that the law will suddenly shift in part, 
but not all, of the service area.278 
The second rationale favoring preemption is the elimination of spillover effects 
that occur when a regulator’s activities have effects beyond the scope of the 
regulator’s jurisdiction. As Judge Michael McConnell explains: 
Externalities present the principal countervailing consideration in favor of 
centralized government: if the costs of government action are borne by the citizens 
of State C, but the benefits are shared by the citizens of States D, E, and F, State 
C will be unwilling to expend the level of resources commensurate with the full 
social benefit of the action.279 
This is one principle animating the Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, but has policy salience even beyond that constitutional boundary. To 
minimize spillover effects, decisionmaking authority must be vested at a high enough 
                                                          
 
275 See Hazlett, supra note 58, at 177 (“Selection of the optimal jurisdiction largely reduces to a search for 
the smallest unit of government (lowest tier) that substantially avoids ‘beggar thy neighbor’ outcomes 
from decentralized policy making.”). 
276 See Daniel A. Lyons, Federalism and the Rise of Renewable Energy: Preserving State and Local Voices 
in the Green Revolution, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1619, 1646 (2014). 
277 Id. 
278 Id. 
279 Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1495 
(1987). 
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level that the decisionmaker can account for the full costs and benefits of a proposed 
action.280 
Of course, this uniformity and predictability does not come without cost. A 
uniform federal scheme has difficulty adapting to the demands of unique local 
circumstances. Federal decisionmakers often lack local knowledge regarding when 
a broad rule needs to be tailored to the idiosyncrasies of a local market, and, even if 
armed with this knowledge, they may lack the incentive to do so. Because state and 
local governments are responsible for a smaller polity than their federal counterparts, 
they are in a better position to know and respond to local concerns.281 A decentralized 
approach is most helpful when important policy matters turn on questions of local 
knowledge that federal regulators are in a poor position to understand. 
There are unquestionably some benefits to be gained from allowing states to 
speak out on net neutrality. To the extent that the residents of Vermont, California, 
Oregon, or Washington feel more strongly in favor of net neutrality protections than 
consumers in other parts of the country, the states’ willingness to enact a rule, risk a 
federal preemption challenge, and expend public time and resources on enforcement 
keeps the political issue alive and signals the strength of their interest to national 
lawmakers, influencing the national debate. In this sense, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that the primary catalysts of state net neutrality rules are not state public utility 
commissioners but governors and state legislators, who are directly elected by their 
constituents and, therefore, are well placed to read their constituents’ preferences and 
communicate them nationally. State legislation can also provide a model for eventual 
federal action, though other than California, most state initiatives thus far mostly 
mimic the FCC’s Open Internet Order. 
These benefits of decentralization are nonetheless outweighed by the spillover 
effects that state-by-state regulation of network management practices can have on 
national networks. Thomas Hazlett explained that in network industries such as 
telecommunications, preemption is often appropriate when inconsistent state laws 
generate spillover effects that prevent companies from achieving interstate 
                                                          
 
280 Lyons, supra note 276, at 1646. 
281 Id. at 1653, 1653 n.164 (quoting Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 395 
(1997) (“Officials ought to look their constituents in the eye on the street and see them in the grocery 
store.”)). 
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economies of scale.282 Economies of scale allow a company to deliver a good cheaper 
and more efficiently by expanding its scale of production. Through expansion, the 
company can spread its fixed costs over a larger volume of sales, which reduces the 
average cost of each unit and therefore lowers the price of its goods for consumers. 
State regulators often undervalue interstate economies of scale and can enter 
inconsistent regulations that prevent companies from achieving efficient growth.283 
This concern underlies much of the arc of telecommunications federalism 
history. Time after time, federal authorities have preempted state regulatory authority 
over networks and services that they perceive as being national in scope, because of 
concerns about uniformity and the risk of inconsistent state-by-state regulation. As 
discussed above, the FCC preempted state regulation of enhanced services upon 
finding that “[t]he enhanced services market generally is national or regional in 
scope, and a degree of certainty and uniformity may be necessary to enable the 
enhanced services market to develop in the way that both state commissions and this 
Commission desire.”284 Similarly, Congress preempted state regulation of mobile 
entry and rates because preemption would “foster the growth and development of 
mobile services that, by their nature, operate without regard to state lines as an 
integral part of the national telecommunications infrastructure.”285 Hazlett showed 
empirically that this preemption was efficient.286 Comparing the mobile markets 
before and after the 1993 statute was enacted, he showed that per-minute prices fell 
80% in the decade following preemption, due to competitive entry and national 
network consolidation that allowed firms to offer nationwide plans efficiently.287 
Similar concerns apply to state-level regulation of network traffic management 
practices. State-specific restrictions can balkanize the Internet by requiring carriers 
                                                          
 
282 See Hazlett, supra note 58, at 177 (citing David F. Welsh, Environmental Marketing and Federal 
Preemption of State Law: Eliminating the “Gray” Behind the “Green,” 81 CALIF. L. REV. 991, 1004 
(1993)). 
283 See id. at 176 (“Importantly, it occurs not just when property rights are ill-defined (the Coasian sense 
of ‘externality’), but when economies of scale extend across states. Then the highly complementary nature 
of supplying consumers in multiple political jurisdictions produces costs and benefits which may largely 
go unnoticed by regulatory authorities.”) (footnote and citation omitted). 
284 In the Matter of Computer III Remand Proceedings, 6 FCC Rcd. 174, 181 (1990). 
285 H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 260 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 587; see Kennedy & 
Purcell, supra note 56. 
286 See Hazlett, supra note 58. 
287 See id. 
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to adopt different rules for different regimes. Carriers may have to adopt different 
traffic protocols for consumers in different jurisdictions. And particularly given that 
state initiatives do not (and perhaps cannot) distinguish between intrastate and 
interstate communications, state-level restrictions limit the services that carriers can 
offer nationally. Importantly, this has a negative effect not only on contracts with 
end-user consumers, but also with services like prioritization or zero-rating that can 
otherwise be marketed to edge providers. As the Commission has noted, edge 
markets are primarily national in scope.288 For congestion-sensitive applications such 
as streaming video or real-time video conferencing, prioritization can be a 
mechanism by which edge providers can deliver a better product to consumers 
without adversely affecting noncongestion-sensitive services.289 Similarly, the 
ability to zero-rate a particular offering can help expand the planes of competition 
among edge providers and allow smaller providers a chance to gain an advantage 
over rivals.290 If broadband providers cannot market such services nationally, they 
are less likely to achieve national economies of scale and will be provided less 
efficiently. At the extreme, the inability to offer prioritization or zero-rating 
nationally may deter edge providers from purchasing such services at all—meaning 
these consumer-friendly offerings will be unavailable even in states where 
consumers want them and regulators have not banned them. 
Even in the unlikely event that every state adopted similar net neutrality 
regulations, there remains the risk of inconsistent interpretation and enforcement. 
For example, many state net neutrality initiatives contain exceptions for network 
traffic management, and reserve the right to review, on a case-by-case basis, 
particular practices that constitute unreasonable interference with the ability of edge 
providers and consumers to reach one another.291 “Reasonable” and “unreasonable” 
are not rules but standards: they provide general guidance but allow the adjudicator 
significant discretion to determine how the general principle should apply in a 
specific case. As noted above, this means that even if every state adopts a textually 
identical exception for “reasonable network management,” they may disagree 
regarding whether a particular traffic management practice is reasonable. 
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Accordingly, even to the extent that state regulation of network management 
practices is permissible under the Communications Act and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, it is nonetheless likely to be inadvisable as a policy matter. The risk of 
spillover effects undermines national economies of scale and thus undermines 
Congress’s overall objective of providing telecommunications services to the largest 
number of people at the lowest cost. 
B. Ongoing State Participation in the Broadband Sphere 
But this does not suggest that states should abandon the field entirely when it 
comes to broadband policy. While state economic regulation of broadband networks 
is likely inefficient, decentralized authority is best where issues are primarily local 
in scope; or in Professor Hazlett’s terms, “the advantage of differentiation lies in the 
informational efficiencies local regulators enjoy relative to the advantages of scale 
economies they sacrifice (or disrupt).”292 The Communications Act’s wireless 
preemption regime is instructive: state economic regulation is preempted, in order to 
promote national economies of scale in wireless networks.293 But states continue to 
play a role in consumer protection, reflecting the fact that consumer protection issues 
may arise due to the idiosyncratic vulnerabilities of a particular segment of the 
population that could escape the notice of a national regulatory body.294 
It follows that concurrent state jurisdiction is appropriate over consumer 
protection issues in the broadband sphere, as long as the action does not serve as a 
backdoor to rate regulation. This would justify state disclosure and transparency 
obligations, which hew more closely to traditional contract principles as applied to 
the broadband industry. Although the Restoring Internet Freedom Order preempts 
state disclosure obligations that exceed those in the Order, earlier Commission 
decisions left room for states to adopt disclosure requirements that supplement, but 
do not contradict, federal efforts.295 
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State buildout initiatives can also be beneficial to consumers. The Vermont 
statute’s Connectivity Initiative is an excellent example.296 The Initiative seeks to 
identify areas of the state that are unserved or underserved by existing broadband 
offerings and work with broadband providers to subsidize new capital deployment 
to these areas.297 State regulators can capitalize on superior local knowledge about 
the conditions throughout the state to augment the FCC’s own Connect America 
Fund efforts.298 The FCC experimented with this approach in 2017, when it granted 
New York’s request to allow the state to award CAF-II funding earmarked for the 
state, in conjunction with the state’s own broadband subsidy program.299 
V. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, state net neutrality initiatives are driven largely by policy 
disagreements with the Trump Administration. Given that the conflict is largely 
political, it is appropriate for state lawmakers to respond through political processes. 
It is unsurprising to see states participating in the legal challenge to the Restoring 
Internet Freedom Order. It would also be unsurprising for them to file comments in 
Commission proceedings, or to lobby federal policymakers in favor of legislation 
that would correct what they see as mistakes by the agency. In each of these 
instances, the states could use existing legal and political channels to defend their 
interests and provide local information to federal decisionmakers in the judiciary, the 
agency, and the legislature. 
But the executive orders and statutes passed in response to the Restoring 
Internet Freedom Order likely exceed the states’ power to make their voices heard in 
this area. Broadband networks are inherently interstate, placing them beyond the 
traditional realm of state telecommunications regulation. The initiatives are likely 
preempted by federal law, and even if the legal challenge to the Restoring Internet 
Freedom Order is successful, the principles of conflict preemption dictate that these 
state initiatives can, at most, supplement federal policy in this area. As the Restoring 
Internet Freedom Order notes, states can and will continue to play a role in broadband 
regulation by enforcing general consumer protection laws alongside the FCC and the 
Federal Trade Commission.300 But preemption doctrines rightly prevent the states 
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from balkanizing the Internet according to the dictates of multiple regulatory regimes 
in ways that interfere with the policy judgments of the federal government’s primary 
communications regulatory agency. 
